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I. ARGUMENT 
A. IF THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MERITS 
OF MARTIN'S CLAIMS, MARTIN DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS IN 
LAW BASED SOLELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CLAIMS. 
After five years, Martin finally capitulates that "the District Court lacked standing to 
reach the merits of his claims against the government".l Yet, in order to escape an award of 
attorney fees Martin incongruously draws the conclusion that: 
Martin will not concede he in any way acted without a reasonable basis in law or 
fact in bringing and prosecuting his action. . .. The District Court's findings on 
the merits of Martin's claim ... clearly show Camas County was not acting within 
the confines of LLUP A. 2 
If the district court lacked standing to reach the merits of his claims, then it is no defense for 
Martin to assert the district court's findings on the merits of Martin's claims evidence a 
reasonable basis "in law" via a declaratory judgment action. Martin places the proverbial cart 
before the horse as standing is a condition precedent to a district court's jurisdiction to address 
the merits ofa proponent's claims. 
It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to 
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing. Standing is a preliminary 
question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case. 
The doctrine of standing is a subcategory of justiciability. 3 
In Zingiber Investment, LLC v. Hagerman Highway District, this Court noted that: 
Although we find the issue of standing moot, we nevertheless find that Zingiber's 
case was without a reasonable basis in the law. In order to have standing, a party 
must allege a "distinct palpable injury" and a "fairly traceable" causal connection 
between that injury and the challenged conduct. The District's grant of a 
construction permit to build a pipeline on the District's right-of-way did not cause 
I Respondent's Brief, p. 6. 
2 Jd. Martin finds noteworthy that "[c]onspicuously, the County does not even allege or even address many of the 
District Court's findings on the merits." /d, at 7. While we certainly do dispute the district court's findings on the 
merits, they were also irrelevant. 
3 Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 513, 248 P.3d 1243, 1248 (2011)("Martin 1") quoting Young v. City of 
Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105,44 P.3d 1157, 1159-1160 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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any of Zingiber's alleged injuries. As Judge Melanson held, " Zingiber's remedies, 
ifany, are between Zingiber and LynClif." We thus find that the district court was 
correct in awarding fees to the District.4 
Martin's reasonable basis "in law" was pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. 5 As 
this Court noted in Martin I, 
Title 10, chapter 12 of the Idaho Code is titled the "Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act" and provides authority for courts of record to declare rights, status 
and other legal relations. See I.e. §§ 10-1201, 10-1216. Idaho Code § 10-1202 
provides, inter alia: "Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations 
are affected by a ... municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of 
construction or validity arising under the ... ordinance ... and obtain a declaration 
of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." "[T]he [Uniform] Declaratory 
Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring 
the action in the first instance. ,,6 
As a matter of law, Martin acted without a reasonable basis in law in bringing this declaratory 
judgment action. Martin cannot escape attorney fees in reliance upon the district court's findings 
on the purported merits of Martin's claims where Martin admittedly failed to present a justiciable 
case or controversy thereby depriving the district court of its jurisdiction to have ever reached the 
merits of his claims. 
B. STANDING: THE FUNDAMENTAL TENET OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
Idaho Code § 12-117 is not a discretionary statute.7 Idaho Code § 12-117 unequivocally 
provides that the court shall award attorney fees "if the court finds that the party ... acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Certainly, while this Court has consistently noted 
that fees are not available against a party that presents on appeal a "legitimate question for this 
4 Zingiber Investment, LLC v. Hagerman Highway District, 150 Idaho 675,684,249 P.3d 868,879 (2011)(intemal 
citations omitted). 
5 I.e. § 10-1201 et seq. 
6 Martin, 150 Idaho at 512-513, 248 P.3d at 1247-1248 citing Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 
1232, 1237 (2006). 
7 Rincover v. State, Dept. a/Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549,976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). 
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Court to address"s, Martin did not present any argument for this Court to address but rather 
conceded that he and the district court lacked standing. If Martin contends that he prosecuted 
this action with a reasonable basis in law, one would think that you would at least postulate this 
purported particularized standing in a Respondent's Brief. 
Instead, to escape attorney fees Martin merely attacks the generic doctrine of standing 
itself. Based upon this Court's articulation in Martin I that the "doctrine [of standing] is 
imprecise and difficult to apply,,9, Martin asserts that this Court basically "invited" him to bring 
this action. 
Given the state of the law regarding standing [and this Court's] invitations to 
bring a declaratory judgment action ... can it be said [that] Martin's action had no 
reasonable basis in fact or law ... ?10 
While we agree that the doctrine of standing is, in certain instances, difficult to apply, this does 
not present Martin with carte blanche impunity to seek the injunction of repealed legislation on 
behalf of the general citizenry based entirely upon purported procedural errors committed in its 
enactment. Arrogating to himself the role of the political watchdog, even on appeal Martin 
asserts that, in the absence of standing, he nonetheless may reasonably "attempt to correct 
'mistakes' that shouldn't have been made".ll This patently ignores the very meaning and 
purpose of the law of standing. 
The law of standing is not in such a state of flux as to preclude an award of attorney fees 
nor can the analysis of Martin's purported standing be characterized as imprecise and difficult to 
apply. Time and time again, this Court has repeatedly noted that one who legitimately incurs an 
injury may seek redress via a declaratory judgment action. 
8 Arambarri v. Armstrong, 2012 WL739486 (March 8, 2012); citing Lane Ranch P'ship v. City a/Sun Valley, 145 
Idaho 87,91,175 P.3d 776,780 (2007). 
9 Martin, 150 Idaho at 513,248 P.3d at 1248 quoting Young, 137 Idaho at 104-105,44 P.3d at 1159-1160. 
10 Respondent's Brief, P. 8. 
II !d. 
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While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not subject to direct judicial 
review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of collateral actions such as 
declaratory actions. 12 
As noted in Martin I, 
Here, a party whose property had been downzoned by the 2008 zoning 
amendments would unquestionably have standing to bring this action, as would a 
property owner who could show a specific palpable harm that he would incur 
from the imminent development of an upzoned neighboring property. Therefore, 
even if the upzoning of property in Camas County could be found to constitute a 
generalized injury to some of the remaining property owners that generalized 
grievance does not confer standing to sue under the Koeh/3 exception. 
Martin has not pled facts to support his contention that he cannot develop 
his properties in the same manner that he could have prior to the 2007 and 2008 
zoning amendments. 14 
This is of course academic since Martin fails to present argument to this Court. Nonetheless, to 
the extent Martin insinuates that he acted reasonably, we would note that while Martin may have 
alleged purported procedural errors to the district court in conclusory terms, he never presented 
evidence or legal argument how his right to procedural due process had been prejudiced or injury 
sustained by virtue of the alleged procedural errors nor had he or the district court ever 
recognized the necessity of this required nexus. IS Further, Martin's arguments ignored the plain 
and unambiguous language of numerous statutes l6 including I.C. § 67-6504,17 I.e. § 67-6506,18 
I.C. § 67-6508,19 I.C. § 67-6509,20 I.e. § 67-6511, I.e. § 67-653521 , and I.e. § 67-653622, 
12 Burns v. Madison County, 147 Idaho 660,664,214 P.3d 646, 650 (2009) quoting Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 
Idaho 65, 66, 665 P.2d 1075,1076 n. 2 (1983); McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657,851 P.2d 953 (1993 
13 Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008). 
14 Martin, 150 Idaho at 512-513, 248 P.3d at 1247-1248 citing Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 
1232, 1237 (2006). 
15 RVol.2, P. 385- 394; R Vol. 3. P. 408-414; R. Vol. 2, P. 252-262. 
16 Ignoring the plain and unambiguous language of a state is ground for attorney fees. See Gardiner v. Boundary 
County, 148 Idaho 764,769,229 P.3d 369,374 (2010); Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 88-
91, 175 P.3d 776, 778-80 (2007); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). 
17 R. Vol. 1, P. 184-187. 
18 R. Vol. 1, P. 184-187, R Vol. 2, P. 254-262. 
19 R Vol. 1, P. 184-187 
20 R Vol. 1, P. 184-187; R Vol. 1, P. 165-166; R Vol. 2, P. 309-312 
21 R. Vol. 1, P. 184-187; R Vol. 2, P. 312-313 
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The failure to present any substantive argument on appeal coupled with Martin's 
admission that he failed to present a justiciable case or controversy is clearly a basis to award 
attorney fees. In Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, this Court noted that 
An award of attorney fees is appropriate here because this Court is left with the 
abiding feeling that the appeal was pursued without reasonable basis in fact or 
law. As mentioned above, most of the issues were moot. In oral argument before 
the Court, Euclid's counsel essentially conceded that the appeal was primarily for 
the purpose of making a point and that any claim for damages was rather tenuous. 
In any event, that issue was conceded away in Euclid's brief.23 
Similarly, Martin concedes the district court was without jurisdiction to address the 
merits of Martin's claims. Moreover, absent any allegation that Martin was deprived of a 
substantial right, the issue whether to enjoin repealed legislation based entirely upon purported 
procedural errors committed in its enactment was moot long before trial. While Martin wishes to 
believe the law of standing is in a state of flux, this Court's decision in Martin I has not so 
altered the law of standing as to throw open the courthouse doors for Martin to act on behalf of 
the general citizenry. Regardless, in conceding he lacked standing, Martin failed to present 
argument to this Court on appeal demonstrating his purported reasonable basis in the law. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the County respectfully requests that this Court reverse and 
vacate the district court's order, judgment, and award of attorney fees and award to the County 
its Attorney Fees and Costs in defending this Action on appeal and direct the district court to 
enter judgment in the Appellant's favor awarding the County its reasonable attorney fees and 
costs in defending this Action before the district court. 
22 R. Vol. 1, P's. 159-165, 185. While it is undisputed that the County duly recorded each and every hearing (R. 
Vol. 3, P. 427), Martin cited numerous meeting dates in support of its argument that a transcribable record was 
required for every public hearing or for deliberations which include any and every meeting; that a record was 
required regardless of whether "an appeal is provided for" R. Vol. 1, P's. 162; 
23 Euclid Avenue Trust v. City a/Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 310,193 P.3d 853,857 (2008). 
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Dated this 30th day of March, 2012. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Pau . Fitzer 
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